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A Proposed Solution to the Notification Problem 
Ralph F. Hall 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A hard beginning hath a good ending. 
- James Howell 
 
First, I want to acknowledge and thank the contributors 
who have invested significant time and effort to this project; 
their contributions have made this colloquy possible.  This 
commentary will build upon the contributors’ thoughts, identify 
the stakeholder objectives, review the current notification 
trigger proposals, and advance a new solution. 
At its core, this is a debate about information.  It is a 
debate over how information about device malfunctions should 
be gathered and when and how that information should be 
disseminated.  There is manifest dissatisfaction with the 
current criteria for triggering a device malfunction notification.  
The colloquy contributors have demonstrated the complexity 
and multidisciplinary nature of these challenges, the strong 
need for a solution, and the absence of any simple solution.  
These challenges exist within a complex, congressionally 
mandated regulatory structure which must be honored.  Any 
solution must combine legal and regulatory requirements, 
scientific, medical, and clinical considerations, statistical and 
analytical tools, communication expertise, and public policy.  
This commentary shall concentrate on the legal, regulatory, 
and public policy aspects of this problem with particular 
emphasis on the notification trigger issue. 
The overall approach is to use, whenever possible, existing 
systems and regulatory structures.  Generally, the analysis will 
be at the policy level.  Specific implementation details, 
particularly technical matters, can be addressed after there is 
general agreement on the core policy issues.  Once there is 
agreement on policy, the details, while important and complex, 
can be resolved. 
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II. ANY PROPOSAL MUST ADDRESS STAKEHOLDER 
OBJECTIVES AND SATSIFY PUBLIC POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
If you don’t know where you’re going, you might not get there. 
- Yogi Berra 
A. THE STAKEHOLDER OBJECTIVES 
This colloquy has identified five core objectives: (1) protect 
and advance public health through both the dissemination of 
relevant device malfunction information and the promotion of 
lifesaving technologies such as implanted cardiac defibrillators 
(ICDs), (2) create and maintain trust among all the 
stakeholders, (3) maintain the primary role and responsibility 
of the physician for patient care, (4) maintain the integrity of 
the regulatory system, and (5) provide certainty for all 
stakeholders.  These stakeholder objectives must both frame 
any proposed solutions and provide a yardstick against which 
proposals are to be measured. 
1. Advance Public Health 
The overarching objective is to advance public health.  This 
requires appropriate dissemination of device malfunction 
information and the appropriate use of lifesaving devices.1  
Three facts must be kept in mind in this quest to advance 
public health.  First, devices such as ICDs have saved 
thousands of lives.2  Second, a malfunctioning device can have 
fatal effects.  Third, the lack of a device has killed innumerably 
more people than all defective devices combined. 
2. Establish Trust 
Patients literally trust their lives to ICDs and, therefore, 
must have trust in the manufacturer and the regulatory 
                                                          
 1. See Heart Rhythm Society & FDA, Proceedings Document from the 
Policy Conference on Pacemaker and ICD Performance 2 (Sept. 16, 2005) 
[hereinafter Proceedings], available at 
http://www.hrsonline.org/advocacyDocs/HRS-device_conference.pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., Michael R. Bristow et al., Cardiac-Resynchronization 
Therapy with or Without an Implantable Defibrillator in Advanced Chronic 
Heart Failure, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2140 (2004); Arthur J. Moss et al., 
Prophylactic Implantation of a Defibrillator in Patients with Myocardial 
Infarction and Reduced Ejection Fraction, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 877 (2002). 
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system.3  Trust starts with communicating realistic 
expectations to the patient, including the fact that any device 
or medical procedure presents certain unavoidable risks.  Trust 
also requires transparency, and that involves providing 
information even if the information may not be actionable or 
required.  In the past, the patient often simply deferred 
decisions to the physician.  Today, many patients play an active 
role in health care decisions and want, need, and have direct 
access to health care information. 
3. Maintain the Role of the Physician 
The physician has historically had the primary 
responsibility for the patients’ medical care.  Physicians, 
generally with the support of other stakeholders, feel the need 
to maintain that relationship.  As such, any solution should not 
intrude into or replace the patient-physician relationship.  
Given this relationship, physicians generally want to be the 
first person to inform the patient of device issues. 
4. Ensure Regulatory Integrity 
FDA must maintain the integrity of the regulatory system.  
This is its statutory responsibility.4  Industry has a parallel 
interest.  For competitive reasons, industry wants a level 
playing field; this requires the consistent and predictable 
application of regulatory requirements. 
5. Provide Certainty 
Stakeholders in general and industry in particular want 
clearly defined rules.  Otherwise, everyone faces post facto 
judging and public criticism.  If the rules are clear and objective 
then companies will simply comply.  In this context, certainty 
allows everyone to know when a safety alert will be triggered. 
B. CONGRESS HAS ADDRESSED THIS POLICY ISSUE 
The question of what should trigger a product notification 
is obviously a policy question.  Congress is often the arbiter of 
                                                          
 3. See Dianne M. Bartels, Disclosing Risks of New Technologies: Ethical 
Challenges for Physicians, Patients, and Companies, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
183 (2005); Lisa Salberg, Heart Rythm [sic] Society and the FDA Hold Policy 
Conference on Pacemaker and ICD Performance, HEART LINK ONLINE, Oct. 7, 
2005, www.enewsbuilder.net/hypertrophic/e_article000468321.cfm?x=b11,0,w. 
 4. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000). 
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such policy questions, and Congress has spoken on this issue.  
Subsections (a) and (e) of 21 U.S.C. § 360h describe in detail 
the criteria by which FDA should mandate either a notification 
to physicians or an actual device recall. 
Under § 360h(a), FDA can mandate a product notification 
if a product “presents an unreasonable risk of substantial 
harm” and a physician notification is “necessary to eliminate 
the unreasonable risk of such harm.”5  Similarly, FDA can 
mandate a recall under § 360h(e) if there is “a reasonable 
probability that a device . . . would cause serious, adverse 
health consequences or death.”6 
Manufacturers also have the opportunity to provide 
product notification through voluntary recalls.  Under 21 
C.F.R. § 7.40, manufacturers perform such recalls in order to 
“carry out their responsibility to protect the public health and 
well-being from products that present a risk of injury or gross 
deception or are otherwise defective.”7 
Congress has an established policy that a physician 
notification of a device malfunction should occur based upon 
risk and probability.  This same policy should apply whether 
FDA mandates a notification under § 360h or the manufacturer 
conducts a “voluntary” recall.  In one case, FDA can mandate 
the notification, in the other, FDA can bring an enforcement 
action for the failure to notify.8  In either case, the patient need 
is the same and there should be no meaningful legal or policy 
difference between these two paths to a physician notification. 
I am not writing on a blank slate.  Congress has spoken on 
this issue and that policy determination must shape any 
proposals to address malfunction notification issues.  After 
identifying the key issue with the current system, I will 
propose improvements to the device notification system that 
will satisfy these objectives. 
III. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE SYSTEM 
Where’s the Beef? 
- Wendy’s television commercial 
 
                                                          
  5. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a). 
 6. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e). 
 7. 21 C.F.R. § 7.40 (2005). 
 8. See 21 U.S.C. § 331. 
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While there is agreement that the malfunction notification 
system must change, there is no consensus on where the 
system has failed.  Someone has objected to every part of the 
process.  A close examination, however, demonstrates that the 
decision as to whether to trigger a safety alert is the key issue.  
For example, in the Prizm 2 situation,9 the event reporting and 
analysis process worked, and in 2005 the situation was 
presented for management decision whether to commence a 
physician notification.10  It was that initial decision not to 
notify physicians that started the controversy.11 
There is little or no data that suggests that the current 
event reporting and analysis system is the main problem.  If 
there is a major gap in the event reporting and analysis 
process, then there must be some significant number of 
unknown device malfunction issues lurking out there.  While 
one does not know what one does not know, there have been 
relatively few situations when years have passed during which 
devices malfunctioned without reports being made to the 
manufacturer or FDA.  While these processes can and should 
be strengthened, that will not solve the problem. 
Other commentators have identified weaknesses in the 
communication process.  However, the fact is that once a safety 
alert decision has been made, information has gotten to the 
vast majority of physicians and patients in a relatively prompt 
fashion.  Can the communications be made faster?  Of course.  
Can the communications be more understandable?  Of course.  
Was the Prizm 2 controversy the result of garbled 
communications?  Of course not. 
While I will address various aspects of the overall 
notification system, starting with the event reporting and 
analysis process, I will focus on the key trigger question. 
                                                          
       9. See Robert Steinbrook, The Controversy over Guidant’s Implantable 
Defibrillators, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 221, 221-22 (2005); see also Ralph F. 
Hall, To Recall or Not to Recall, That Is the Question: The Current Controversy 
over Medical Device Recalls, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 161, 161-62 (2005). 
 10. Steinbrook, supra note 9, at 222; Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device 
Kept Flaw from Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A1. 
 11. Guidant subsequently did commence a physician notification.  See 
Hall, supra note 9, at 163. 
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 IV. EVENT REPORTING AND ANALYSIS 
The Plural of Anecdote Is Not Evidence 
- Scott Ratzan12 
 
The fundamental purpose of the event reporting and 
analysis process is to identify device malfunction trends.  These 
trends or issues are then presented to a decisionmaker, 
generally the manufacturer, to decide whether a product safety 
alert is needed. 
Device performance data can come from two basic sources: 
(1) field experience and events, and (2) in-house investigations, 
bench testing, and analysis. 
A. FIELD EVENT REPORTING 
Field performance data can be collected by two 
fundamental methods: (1) a “passive” system in which 
individual events are reported by a physician, and (2) an 
“active” surveillance or registry system that proactively collects 
data. 
Passive systems, such as the Medical Device Reporting 
(MDR) system,13 pose a number of limitations.  First, 
underreporting is a recognized problem.14  Particularly for low 
frequency events, every report is critical.  There is a consensus 
that physicians need to improve reporting rates and 
completeness.15  Second, passive systems provide only a raw 
number of events and not the incident rate; therefore, such a 
system may not provide a valid basis for medical decisions.16  
Without more information, mere reports of some field event 
may or may not mean something. 
Paradoxically, another major weakness of the MDR system 
is that the system gets flooded with too many (generally 
                                                          
 12. Scott Ratzan, The Plural of Anecdote Is Not Evidence, 7 J. HEALTH 
COMMC’NS 169 (2002). 
 13. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 803 (2005) (outlining MDR requirements). 
 14. See Steinbrook, supra note 9, at 223; Proceedings, supra note 1, at 5. 
 15. Bruce L. Wilkoff, ICDs: Dealing with Less Than Perfect, 16 J. 
CARDIOVASCULAR ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 796, 796-97 (2005). 
 16. See Mark Carlson,  The Twin Pillars—Knowledge and Trust , 7 MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 177, 178 (2005);  Robert  G. Hauser & Barry J. Maron, 
Lessons from the Failure and Recall of an Implantable Cardioverter-
Defibrillator, 112 CIRCULATION 2040, 2041-42 (2005). 
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unimportant) reports.  In 2004, FDA received over 180,000 
MDR reports, including several Prizm 2 reports.17  Most MDR 
reports reflect known issues or adverse effects.  Key data 
regarding new issues can get lost in this sea of irrelevant 
information.  The lack of common terminology, staff shortages, 
and inconsistent reporting also add to the analytical 
challenges. 
Eventually, MDR reports are entered into the publicly 
available Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience 
(MAUDE) database.  There are justifiable frustrations and 
complaints with the MAUDE database.  The data is often 
incomplete, incorrect, or out-of-date.18  The biggest weakness 
may well be the difficulty in using the MAUDE database to 
identify or analyze product malfunction trends or patterns.  
The system can be enhanced by improved physician reporting 
using common terminology and, to a lesser extent, 
manufacturer performance. Timeliness and accessibility are 
likewise data management challenges. 
The other key data source is active surveillance systems or 
device registries.  Some registries do not include “denominator” 
data (total device population or usage) and thus actual incident 
rates cannot be determined.  Active surveillance systems must 
include large numbers of patients in order to have the 
statistical power to identify a low frequency event.  This is a 
practical limitation on the current usefulness of such systems.  
Active surveillance systems can be time-consuming and 
expensive and so may not be practical in many situations.  
Some new approaches, such as using health insurance claims to 
identify device malfunctions, offer new avenues for data 
collection. 
B. MANUFACTURER DEVICE ANALYSIS RESPONSIBILITY 
The manufacturer has the obligation to investigate any 
alleged device malfunction or event trends.19  This process can 
include bench testing, failure analysis, analysis of returned 
devices, review of clinical information, trending, and statistical 
analysis.20  These investigations are a key step in converting 
                                                          
 17. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 3. 
 18. See Salberg, supra note 3. 
 19. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 820.100 (2005) (describing the Corrective and 
Preventive Action requirements). 
 20. The specifics of these processes are beyond the scope of this colloquy.  
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isolated data points, such as a field report, into product trends, 
event frequencies, root causes, and corrective actions. 
The fact that the manufacturer generally performs failure 
analysis and trending strikes some as a conflict of interest.  If 
safety alerts are bad for the company, then will the 
manufacturer be less diligent in investigations and less willing 
to trigger a safety alert?  Some have suggested using 
independent third parties to perform this task.  However, for at 
least the foreseeable future, only the manufacturer can have 
the knowledge, equipment, personnel, or systems to fulfill this 
responsibility.  Moreover, current regulations clearly place this 
responsibility on the manufacturer.21  FDA routinely inspects a 
manufacturer’s Corrective and Preventive Action (CAPA) 
system, complaint handling, and MDR systems to ensure 
compliance.22 
In the end, information from all sources, internal and 
external, active and passive, must be combined to identify 
issues, determine ongoing investigation needs, and provide 
valid information to decisionmakers. 
C. THE DEFINITION OF MALFUNCTION MUST INCLUDE ALL 
CLINICALLY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND BE CONSISTENT WITH THE 
REMAINDER OF THE DEVICE REGULATORY SYSTEM. 
Through this debate and this colloquy, commentators have 
generally discussed “device malfunctions” without any specific 
definition.23  Surveillance systems are intended to collect 
information about device malfunctions.  Everyone recognizes, 
however, that not all adverse device events are created equal.  
Some are life-threatening while others are simply 
inconveniences. 
The malfunction definition must be clinically relevant and 
uniform across companies and device types.  Rather than 
reinvent the wheel and create additional layers of complexity 
and confusion, I suggest using a preexisting and well-known (at 
                                                          
Other groups, such as the Guidant Task Force, are working on enhancing 
these systems.  See Press Release, Guidant, Guidant Independent Panel 
Recruited, Begins Deliberations (Aug. 29, 2005), 
www.guidant.com/news/500/web_release/nr_000573.shtml. 
 21. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 820.100 (2005). 
 22. See, e.g., FDA, Quality System Inspections Technique, 
www.fda.gov/cdrh/comp/qsitpage.html (last updated Sept. 3, 2002) (specifying 
the process for inspections of these systems). 
 23. See Hauser & Maron, supra note 16, at 2042. 
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least to manufacturers) definition—the definition of a 
reportable event from the MDR regulations.  The existing MDR 
regulations define reportable events as deaths, serious injuries, 
or device malfunctions that may lead to death or serious 
injury.24  Clinically irrelevant events should be filtered out 
through the application of this definition. 
While not perfect, this definition is uniform, well-known, 
and designed to capture all clinically relevant events.25  This 
definition can even take into account normal end-of-life 
replacements of battery-operated devices.26 In addition, by 
using this definition, the internal CAPA processes, the MDR 
system, and the MAUDE database are tied together with the 
device malfunction notification process.  This allows for easier 
analysis, clearer communication, and fewer different systems.27  
If the MDR definition gets updated in the future, that new 
definition would simply roll into these other processes. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The surveillance and analysis systems can and should 
continuously be improved.  These efforts should be led from the 
scientific, engineering, medical, and clinical community with 
support from the legal and regulatory functions.  A number of 
efforts are underway to do just that.  For example, the Heart 
Rhythm Society (HRS) and the Guidant Independent Task 
Force are addressing certain of these issues.  FDA and others 
                                                          
 24. The MDR regulations define “malfunction” as follows: “Malfunction 
means the failure of a device to meet its performance specifications or 
otherwise perform as intended.  Performance specifications include all claims 
made in the labeling for the device.”  21 C.F.R. § 803.3(n) (2005).  “Serious 
injury” is defined as an injury or illness that: “(i) Is life-threatening, (ii) 
Results in permanent impairment of a body function or permanent damage to 
a body structure; or (iii) Necessitates medical or surgical intervention to 
preclude permanent impairment of a body function or permanent damage to a 
body structure.”  21 C.F.R. § 803.3 (bb)(1) (2005). 
 25. Another option would be to use the definition of a “serious, adverse 
health consequence” in 21 C.F.R. § 810.2(i) (2005).  This definition, however, is 
less well-known than the MDR definition and could be interpreted to exclude 
events otherwise included in the MDR definition.  For example, “injuries that 
are nonlife-threatening and that are temporary and reasonably reversible” are 
excluded from the definition of “serious, adverse health consequence.”  See id. 
 26. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(i) (defining expected life). 
 27. There are certain aspects of the MDR regulations that are not 
relevant for notification purposes.  For example, the obligation to report events 
before investigation is complete is important for MDR reporting but not 
particularly relevant for malfunction notification. Overall, however, the MDR 
reporting structure works well for notification purposes. 
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are exploring new ways to access data from health insurance 
claims databases.  While many issues still remain open, 
including who pays for these changes, these improvement 
efforts should be encouraged, coordinated, and supported. 
To improve the surveillance and analysis systems, key 
recommendations include: 
? Improve the rate of physician reporting of device 
malfunctions; 
? Include complete information in individual event 
reports; 
? Filter reports of known issues so that truly new 
events are more visible; 
? Increase rates of physicians returning devices for 
evaluation and interrogating devices; 
? Improve the robustness, timeliness, and 
accessibility of the MAUDE database; 
? Use common terminology and coding; 
? Improve registries and active surveillance 
systems; 
? Use health claims databases for event detection; 
and 
? Ensure ongoing FDA oversight of manufacturers’ 
compliance with event reporting and analysis 
requirements. 
As the surveillance systems improve, more low and ultra-
low frequency events will be found.  As such, the decision on 
what triggers a physician notification will only become more 
important. 
V. A NEW APPROACH IS NEEDED AS THE PROPOSED 
NOTIFICATION TRIGGERS DO NOT SATISFY 
STAKEHOLDER OBJECTIVES 
There is always an easy answer to every human problem – 
neat, plausible and wrong. 
- Mencken’s Law 
 
As previously stated, the key question is under what 
circumstances should a manufacturer notify physicians of 
device malfunctions.  Answer this question correctly and the 
physicians and patients needs are met, and industry has the 
certainty it seeks.  Any viable trigger must satisfy four criteria: 
(1) it must be objective, (2) it must be clinically relevant, (3) it 
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must be consistent with FDA’s statutory and regulatory 
structure, and (4) it must be applicable to all medical devices. 
A. THE CRITERIA FOR TRIGGERING A PRODUCT SAFETY ALERT 
MUST BE LINKED TO PHYSICIANS’ NEEDS 
Physicians need information that will assist them in 
providing patient care.  This includes new information 
regarding previously unknown or unanticipated device 
malfunctions.28 
The physician should be charged with knowing the content 
of the device labeling at the time of the implant and the device 
performance information that is otherwise already publicly 
available. Flooding the physician with redundant information 
adds no benefit and risks important new information being lost 
or ignored.29  Consensus on this point is critical as it drives the 
solution. 
Physicians need information that modifies or changes the 
previously assessed risk/benefit ratio, reduces the risk of a 
malfunction, or modifies how to detect or mitigate the effects of 
a malfunction in devices currently in use.  Physicians also need 
actual information, not simply individual event reports or 
masses of unanalyzed data. 
There is risk in providing “too much” or inappropriate 
information.  Unwise product notices can trigger inappropriate 
medical decisions, lead to patient anxiety, and mask other, 
more important issues.  As Dr. Bruce Wilkoff stated in 
reference to a particular ICD recall: “I am certain that many 
more people have been harmed than helped by our collective 
response and will even die instead of being alive due to the 
removal and replacement of these devices.”30  Other reports 
exist of unfortunate medical intervention (sometimes at the 
insistence of the patient) due to device notifications.  One 
physician has reported that “while Accufix . . . active-fixation 
pacing leads were prone to fracture, more people were harmed 
by extracting normally functioning leads then were harmed by 
the retention wire fracture itself.”31  A New York Times article 
describes a patient who decided to have a device explanted and 
                                                          
 28. See Carlson, supra note 16, at 177. 
 29. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 18. 
 30. Wilkoff, supra note 15, at 796. 
 31. William H. Maisel, Physician Management of Pacemaker and 
Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator Advisories, 27 PACE 437, 441 (2004). 
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replaced because of press reports regarding a series of product 
recalls.32  Of course this is ultimately the patient’s decision.  
However, public pronouncements can certainly (and sometimes 
inappropriately) influence these decisions. 
Likewise, inappropriate notifications undermine the 
agreed objective of encouraging appropriate device usage.  
Continual exposure to minor product notifications that do not 
involve any real-life patient risk can dissuade physicians and 
patients from using lifesaving device therapies. 
It is always easy to say more data should be given.  
However, the risks of excessive notification must be recognized 
and addressed.  It is this concern that renders the trigger issue 
so complex.  The right balance between over- and under–
notification must be struck. 
B. THE CURRENT PROPOSED APPROACHES FAIL TO MEET 
PHYSICIANS’ NEEDS 
Five approaches to the trigger question have been 
advanced. 
Option 1: Notify Physicians of Every Device Malfunction 
The first approach is to simply inform the physician of 
every event even if it involves a known issue.33  In one sense, 
the current MDR and MAUDE systems start to do just this.  
Under the MDR system, any death, serious injury, or 
malfunction that could result in a death or serious injury 
related to the device is to be reported to FDA.34  At some point, 
MDR reports become publicly available to physicians via the 
online MAUDE database. 
But the physician needs information, not simply raw data.  
In order to transform this raw event data into actionable 
information, each physician would need to continually review 
data from multiple sources including the MAUDE database, 
conduct ongoing analyses of possible trends, perform additional 
investigations, and then derive some consistent, medically 
relevant conclusion.  Logic and recent events, however, 
                                                          
 32. See Barry Meier, Repeated Defect in Heart Devices Exposes a History 
of Problems, N.Y. TIMES, October 20, 2005,  at A1. 
 33. See William H. Maisel, Safety Issues Involving Medical Devices: 
Implications of Recent Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Malfunctions, 
294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 955, 956 (2005). 
 34. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.30 (2005). 
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demonstrate that this is not realistic. 35 
The weaknesses in this approach are easily seen in the 
Prizm 2 situation.  According to public reports, all of the Prizm 
2 incidents were reported to FDA via the MDR process and 
some of the event reports were on the MAUDE database when 
that controversy erupted.36  Despite these public filings, doctors 
and FDA were honestly surprised by the Prizm 2 situation.  
Simply having the Prizm 2 MDR reports available to each 
physician was pointless.  Any potential patient harm caused by 
excessive or inappropriate communication is maximized by this 
approach. 
This approach is also inconsistent with the risk/benefit and 
probability-based criteria for FDA-mandated notifications in 21 
U.S.C. §360h.  Overall, this approach fails to satisfy the 
stakeholders’ objectives and so should not be implemented. 
Option 2: Establish a Trigger Based on a Specific Number of 
Device Malfunctions 
Under this approach, FDA would simply establish a 
specific number of events and whenever that number is hit, a 
product alert would be sent out.  For example, a product alert 
could be required whenever ten events of one type have 
occurred. 
The first question is whether society will require a safety 
alert when just one malfunction occurs regardless of the total 
device population or event rate.  In other words, is it acceptable 
as a policy matter that a certain number of malfunctions occur 
before there is a physician notification?  The first possible 
answer is a flat no—if there is a single event it must be 
communicated.  This is simply Option 1 discussed and rejected 
above.  The second possible answer is yes, there is some 
number of events, regardless of incident rate, that should 
trigger a product alert. 
The reality is that the media, lawyers, and Congress often 
get excited about the raw number of events.  It makes for 
                                                          
 35. Placing this responsibility on each individual physician actually 
increases the liability risks of the physician.  For example, a physician could 
well be criticized for failing to identify some trend from the mass of individual 
case reports sent to the physician or available via MAUDE.  Similarly, 
questions can easily arise if physicians come to different conclusions about 
risks and patient care. 
 36. This fact did not prevent Guidant from being subject to extensive 
criticism.  See Hauser & Maron, supra note 16, at 2040-41. 
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sensational press and often has a predictable emotional impact.  
However, emotional reactions and sensational press should not 
drive policy.  A raw number can be incredibly misleading.  Ten 
malfunctions out of 100 devices is a critical issue.  Ten events 
out of 1,000,000 devices is a very different thing. 
Using a raw event number as the trigger flies in the face of 
FDA’s overall regulatory policies.  It is illogical to suddenly 
shift policy when evaluating post-approval device events.  FDA 
explicitly considers probability of benefit and harm when 
determining whether to approve a Premarket Approval 
application (PMA).  For example, when considering a PMA, 
FDA weighs “the probable benefit to health from the use of the 
device weighed against any probable injury or illness.”37  This 
and similar provisions38 clearly demonstrate that FDA uses 
(and must use) a risk/benefit calculation in device approval 
decisions and explicitly considers the probable injury or illness.  
The raw number of events provides only a numerator and is not 
capable of providing the probability of injury or illness.  
Product labeling generally provides event frequency rates 
rather than absolute event numbers as part of the risk/benefit 
analysis.  Stakeholders have the same patient welfare and 
risk/benefit considerations in the premarket approval stage as 
they do postmarket approval.  As such, the same policies should 
exist. 
Likewise, if one examines FDA’s mandatory recall 
authority under 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a), it is apparent that 
risk/benefit or probability concepts are an explicit part of the 
statutory structure.  FDA can mandate a notification to health 
care providers if a device “presents an unreasonable risk of 
substantial harm to the public health.”39  If FDA considers 
event probability for FDA-mandated recalls, it should apply the 
same concepts to the “voluntary” safety alerts performed by 
industry.40  Again, using a simple number of events as the 
                                                          
 37. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(b)(3) (2005); see 21 U.S.C. § 360(e) (2000). 
 38. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 814 (2005). 
      39. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a) (2000). 
 40. While technically the recalls or safety alerts that are the subject of 
this commentary are voluntary industry actions, there is substantial direct 
and indirect FDA oversight and pressure.  See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 
(2005); 21 C.F.R. § 806 (2005) (establishing procedures and obligations for 
manufacturer initiated safety alerts).  If a company fails to conduct a field 
action, FDA has a variety of formal and informal remedies available to it, 
including Form 483 observations.  For example, one observation in a recent 
Guidant Form FDA-483 was that Guidant’s quality system was deficient 
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trigger for a safety alert would result in an unjustifiable policy 
inconsistency. 
Similarly, physicians also make decisions based upon 
probability or frequency rate-based risk/benefit assessment.  
Without a frequency rate or probabilities, the physician and 
patient cannot make any rational risk/benefit decision.  For 
these reasons, product safety alerts almost always include 
frequency rates and probabilities. 
Using just an arbitrary number of events as the trigger 
creates a key gap.  Sometimes the manufacturer can identify an 
issue that has not actually caused a field malfunction but 
rather increases the risk of a future malfunction.  In that case, 
there is no event against which to apply the trigger.  Relying 
only on actual events as the trigger ignores this crucial risk 
prevention or mitigation function of the notification system. 
Finally, there is no logical or policy basis to differentiate 
one number from another.  If we say notify whenever there are 
ten events, why not nine or eleven? 
A trigger based upon the raw number of events will not be 
that helpful for physicians, patients, or policymakers.  Here, 
FDA and all other stakeholders need to take a stand that raw 
event numbers are not an appropriate basis upon which to base 
critical patient care decisions.  This approach is also 
inconsistent with the risk/benefit and probability based criteria 
for FDA-mandated notifications in 21 U.S.C. § 360h.  While 
this approach would give industry certainty, it does not 
advance the needs of physicians and patients. 
Option 3: Establish a Trigger Based on the Frequency or Rate 
of Events 
The next option is to define an objective trigger based upon 
some frequency or event rate.  For example, one could set a 
trigger for a safety alert at a 1/5,000 or 1/1,000 event rate.  This 
approach addresses some of the key weaknesses of Option 2 
while still providing industry with certainty.  It is more 
consistent with other FDA policies.  As such, it merits closer 
scrutiny. 
Several difficult issues exist with this option.  First, what 
                                                          
because physicians had not been notified of several product issues.  See FDA, 
Form FDA-483 (Sept. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ora/frequent/483s/2124215_guidant/MINDOGuidantCorpF
D483_20050901.pdf. 
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should the line be?  The clinical relevance of a particular event 
rate will vary among devices and among individual physicians.  
As demonstrated by the presentation of Dr. Michael Barber, 
there are significant differences in what event rate physicians 
consider relevant for ICDs.41  The value of incident rates as a 
tool for medical decisionmaking was likewise challenged at the 
HRS Policy Conference.  “[O]ne panelist noted that the rate of 
incidents is meaningless unless put in the context of a specific 
patient.”42  Dr. William Maisel’s work also establishes that 
different physicians view the importance of certain levels of 
malfunction probability very differently.  “Physician consensus 
exists regarding the management of some device advisories but 
substantial differences of opinion are present regarding the 
management of many others.”43  Some would act with risks of 
1/10,000 while others would be comfortable up to a 1/100 risk.  
The level of acceptable risk will also vary by device type. 
Second, how should situations be handled in which the 
trend in question is under the anticipated incident rate of the 
device?  For example, assume that the device in question has 
an anticipated and labeled malfunction rate of 0.1%.  The 
actual performance rate is 0.07%, but the notification trigger is 
0.05%.  Would it benefit anyone to take the time and effort to 
notify the physician that the device is performing as well or 
better than anticipated?  If we are consistent in our position 
that physicians should be provided with new information, then 
this approach falls short.  Moreover, notification about 
clinically irrelevant events can also create unnecessary anxiety 
among current patients and can adversely impact the 
willingness of new patients to use devices. 
One could modify this approach and use a frequency rate 
as a trigger for only “new events.”  This requires everyone to 
agree to what is an “old” event and what is a “new” event.  
Current product labeling is certainly of no help as it generally 
does not describe component or process specific failure risk.  
Rate-based triggers also ignore the cumulative impact of 
multiple malfunctions and event severity.  It is practically 
impossible to create different trigger levels for different 
combinations or types of adverse events.  There are multiple 
types of adverse events and often we are concerned with future 
                                                          
 41. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 12. 
 42. Proceedings, supra note 1, at 14. 
 43. Maisel, supra note 31, at 442. 
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events for which there is either a large span of possible effects 
or even unknown effects. 
This approach also relies upon the accuracy of both past 
event reporting and future anticipated malfunction event rates.  
Everyone recognizes that underreporting is a real issue.  Use of 
a frequency-based trigger increases the reliance on the 
robustness of a system everyone questions and on the accuracy 
of future event rate projections. 
In addition, as discussed earlier, there is no logical or 
policy basis to differentiate one number from another.  If we 
say notify whenever the frequency is 0.1%, why not 0.09% or 
0.11%?  Appropriate risk and patient needs vary tremendously 
between devices.  This approach ignores this key fact.  A 
certain malfunction rate may be acceptable for a Class I or 
Class II device, but may not be acceptable for an implantable 
Class III device. 
This approach is also inconsistent with the criteria for 
FDA-mandated notifications under 21 U.S.C. § 360h. This 
provision compels a broader analysis than simply rate.  It 
requires consideration of “unreasonable” risk and potential for 
patient harm.  These considerations are more complex than a 
mere percentage. 
While more enticing than the other options discussed 
above, this option still fails to satisfy the need to provide the 
physician with actionable information or “new” information.  It 
also lacks agreed clinical relevance and can discourage 
additional use of device-based therapy. 
Option 4: Provide Information Deemed Relevant to Patient 
Care Decisions 
This approach proposes a subjective standard—tell the 
physician if it is important.  It requires the manufacturer to 
make a subjective medical judgment.  As such, it fails to 
provide certainty and forces the manufacturer into making 
medical judgments. 
There are multiple problems with this approach.  First, as 
with any subjective standard, there is the challenge of different 
opinions and second-guessing.  Arguably, this is what 
happened in the Prizm 2 situation.  Guidant made the  initial 
assessment that notifying physicians of the Prizm 2 situation 
was not appropriate or required.  Others strongly disagreed.  
Similarly, the lack of objective criteria or certainty would make 
FDA and public oversight difficult. 
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Some have expressed concern that vesting this decision in 
the manufacturer creates an unavoidable conflict of interest.  
At the same time, delegating this task to a private body such as 
HRS or a physician committee raises a host of issues including 
makeup of that body, oversight, and conflict of interest. It also 
may be an impermissible delegation of a government function.44  
FDA itself has historically avoided making such specific 
medical judgments. 
Overall, the approach lacks clarity and certainty and may 
not provide physicians with information that is truly needed.  
This proposal simply repackages many aspects of the current 
system.  A better solution is needed. 
Option 5: Keep the Old System 
Few, if any, advocate keeping the current system 
unchanged.  The current system does not establish any 
objective trigger45 and, for a variety of reasons, has not met 
stakeholder needs.  Under the current system, companies are to 
“carry out their responsibility to protect the public health and 
well-being from products that present a risk of injury or gross 
deception or are otherwise deceptive”46 in making recall 
decisions. One can argue that this is equivalent to the 
subjective standard of Option 4.  In order to add some certainty 
and objectivity, most manufacturers have created their own 
criteria for initiating a recall, often through the use of health 
hazard evaluations (HHE).47  In many ways, this is similar to 
the HHE concept used by FDA to evaluate industry-initiated 
recalls in the current system.48  However, because each 
manufacturer can have a separate HHE, there is no assurance 
of uniformity.  Companies that might “push the envelope” may 
feel “rewarded” by having to conduct fewer safety alerts. 
In addition, current FDA regulations generally link recalls 
with violations of FDA requirements.  “Recall is an effective 
                                                          
 44. See United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Ova II, 414 F. Supp 660, 
665 (D.N.J. 1975), aff’d without opinion, 535 F.2d. 1248 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 45. See Barry Meier, Implants with Flaws: Disclosure or Delay, N.Y. 
TIMES,  June 14, 2005, at C1 (“‘You have to make judgment calls, and there is 
no hard-and-fast rule,’ said Dr. Susan Alert, the chief quality and regulatory 
officer at Medtronic . . . .  ‘Different companies might come out differently.’” ). 
 46. 21 C.F.R. § 7.40 (2005). 
 47. Manufacturers are expected to have a “written contingency plan for 
use in initiating and effecting a recall.”  21 C.F.R. § 7.59 (2005). 
 48. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.41 (2005). 
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method of removing or correcting consumer products that are 
in violation of laws administered by the Food and Drug 
Administration . . . .”49  There may well be situations in which 
the product is not violative, but additional or new safety 
information should be made available to physicians.  Linking 
safety alerts with violations of law confuses quality and 
compliance and can create a strong disincentive against 
initiating safety alerts. 
Given the overwhelming dissatisfaction with the current 
system and its lack of objective and meaningful criteria, it 
seems clear that the existing system has not met the needs or 
objectives of the stakeholders. 
C. A NEW APPROACH: LINK THE NOTIFICATION TRIGGER TO THE 
PRODUCT LABELING 
Given these issues with current approaches, the challenge 
is to identify a realistic alternative approach that satisfies the 
various stakeholder objectives.  This commentary now offers 
such a proposal for consideration.  The basic concept is to link 
the approval process, product labeling,50 and event reporting 
systems with the product notification process.  This proposal 
also differentiates quality improvements from non-compliance 
or a failure to meet product specifications. 
1. Overview 
The core of this proposal is to include in the product 
labeling the total “all cause” predicted malfunction rate for the 
specific device.51  Actual device performance, including both 
actual and predicted malfunctions, would be compared to that 
labeled rate throughout the life of the product.  In this context, 
actual device performance rates would include both actual 
failures and anticipated or predicted failures.  If at any point 
the actual malfunction rate is higher than the predicted 
malfunction rate, then a product safety alert would be 
                                                          
 49. 21 CFR § 7.40(a); see also FDA, Guidance for Industry: Product 
Recalls, Including Removals and Corrections,  
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/recalls/ggp_recall.htm (last updated 
Nov. 3, 2003). 
 50. This commentary uses the term “labeling” in the broad sense as 
defined in 21 U.S.C § 321(m) (2000).  Thus labeling includes the physician’s 
manual or instructions for use for the device.  See id. 
 51. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 14 (“One of the things I’d like to see . 
. . is what the expected failure rate should be.”). 
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required.52  This approach uses the actual product labeling for 
each product as the unique, device-specific trigger for product 
safety alerts.53 
There is also a recognized need to periodically update the 
physician and patient about the performance of an already 
implanted device even if it is performing as specified.54  To 
address this need, the physician’s manual or a product 
performance report would be periodically updated with 
information about device performance even in situations in 
which the device was performing better than the total predicted 
malfunction rate.  Whether one uses the annual report process 
as the jurisdictional basis or an obligation to update the 
labeling as a condition of approval, the result is the same.55  
The physician would have access to new information and a 
periodic performance affirmation. 
This approach also differentiates compliance and quality.  
Compliance sets minimum standards, in this case a 
malfunction rate.  Compliance is binary.  One is either in 
compliance or out of compliance.  Quality, on the other hand, is 
aspirational.  Quality can and should always be improved.  The 
failure to meet the labeled malfunction specification is a 
compliance issue.  Acting to improve device safety or efficacy 
when the device is already meeting labeled requirements is  
quality improvement. 
2. Implementation 
The first step in this process is for manufacturers to 
include the total anticipated malfunction rate in the product 
labeling.  This would be an “all cause” predicted malfunction 
rate.  This rate would be reviewed and approved by FDA as a 
required part of the device labeling before product approval and 
marketing. 
In addition to its use for product safety alert purposes, the 
                                                          
     52.  There may be a degree of uncertainty about a predicted malfunction 
rate given incomplete information.  If the predicted rate range straddles the 
trigger point, at least the product performance report can be updated pending 
more information and certainty. 
 53. Any unique requirements such as the notification requirements for 
certain electronic products would remain applicable.  See 21 C.F.R. § 1003 
(2005). 
 54. See Salberg, supra note 3. 
 55. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 814 (2005) (providing additional information on 
the labeling and annual report requirements). 
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malfunction rate has the additional benefit of providing the 
physician with key information at the time of the implant.  As 
discussed by several commentators, the total predicted 
malfunction rate should be a vital part of the risk/benefit 
analysis and product selection at the time of implant.56 
This approach also allows FDA and physicians to compare 
device performance across time, manufacturer, and feature 
sets.57  Because all companies would have to include an overall 
malfunction rate in their product labeling, quality and 
reliability would truly become transparent and a basis for 
competition. 
Under this approach, the labeled malfunction rate becomes 
the trigger for safety alerts.  As long as the device is performing 
at a level equal to or better than the labeled rate, the initial 
positive risk benefit conclusion remains valid and the device is 
performing as expected.  So, for example, if a product has an 
expected malfunction rate of 0.5% and the actual malfunction 
rate is 0.2%, the physician and patient should be satisfied with 
the original risk benefit analysis and decision.  No product 
safety alert would be required unless and until the malfunction 
rate exceeds 0.5%. 
One key advantage to this approach is that it takes into 
account the overall performance of the device, not just one 
trend.  Under this approach, a product alert can be triggered by 
one event that exceeds the labeled rate.  However, unlike the 
other approaches, a product alert can also be triggered by the 
aggregate impact of multiple trends.  For example, a number of 
small issues might, in aggregate, exceed the expected “all 
cause” malfunction rate when no one issue separately would do 
so.  The initial implant decision is based on aggregate device 
reliability.  If that level is exceeded, the physician should be 
notified. 
One could challenge this approach for failing to 
differentiate between types of malfunctions or their 
implications.  However, this approach offers the flexibility to 
deal with such differences.  If the manufacturer or FDA 
believes that it would be useful to include a more detailed 
                                                          
 56. See Hauser & Maron, supra note 16, at 2042; Proceedings, supra note 
1, at 20, 25. 
 57. Commentators have urged that quality become a marketing tool.  See 
Maisel, supra note 33, at 956 (“Public reporting would make safety a market 
force.”). 
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breakdown by malfunction type or patient impact, then that 
information can simply be included in the labeling along with 
the total predicted malfunction rate.  A safety alert would then 
be required whenever (a) the total malfunction rate was 
exceeded, or (b) a more specific malfunction rate was exceeded.  
This allows labeling flexibility based upon the specific risks, 
characteristics, and usage of different devices. 
One might also object to this approach because of 
weaknesses in event reporting systems.  However, using total 
projected reliability as the trigger, actual event reporting 
variations should have minimal impact.58  The methodology 
used to predict performance when the product is developed and 
approved should be the same methodology used to update the 
predicted malfunction rate.  As such, data reporting variability 
should be neutralized.  This approach also focuses on trends, 
not single events. 
Actual performance from the MAUDE database, registries, 
or other information sources would be available as both an 
input into the predicted malfunction rate and as a public check 
on actual performance and accuracy of the predictions.  
Furthermore, FDA routinely inspects the manufacturer’s 
systems that are the input into the predicted performance 
rates, resulting in a built-in check on company performance. 
Including a total anticipated malfunction rate in product 
labeling is well within FDA’s authority.  FDA can require 
companies to include that overall malfunction rate in PMA and 
Supplemental Premarket Approval (SPMA) submissions and to 
include that rate in the product labeling.59  Of course, similar 
methodologies are needed for cross-company comparisons.  If 
there are not already acceptable industry standards, FDA can 
develop guidance documents (with stakeholder input) to 
establish a common methodology for various device classes.  
FDA’s approval and inspection processes should ensure 
consistent application of these standards. 
The final question is whether this concept is consistent 
with FDA’s mandatory notification powers.  It is.  Devices are 
                                                          
 58. Any impact of low reporting rates also applies to other suggested 
approaches.  For example, using a raw number of events or an actual 
frequency rate as the trigger depends upon robust reporting.  Here, 
engineering analysis can be used to calculate the predicted failure rate and 
thus compensate for any low reporting issues. 
 59. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.20, 814.39 (2005);  21 C.F.R. § 860.7(b), (d) 
(2005). 
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approved and labeled to reflect a risk/benefit balance.60  Using 
the labeled predicted malfunction rate as the trigger 
incorporates this risk/benefit consideration and is consistent 
with the risk based criteria in 21 U.S.C. § 360h. 
3. This Concept Works for All Factual Situations 
Once the total projected malfunction rate has been 
established, any malfunction trend falls logically into one of 
four categories.  A detailed review of each category 
demonstrates that this approach satisfies the various 
stakeholder objectives and can be reasonably implemented. 
a. Group 1 
In this first category, the malfunction trend in question is 
known and by itself or in combination with all other 
malfunctions is within the labeled predicted malfunction rate.  
In this case, the devices are performing as predicted and 
intended.  By definition, the performance of these devices is 
equal to or better than the information used to make the initial 
risk/benefit decision to implant the device. 
There is no need for any safety alert as the physician has 
had the necessary information since the time of implant and 
has already been able to take it into account in making health 
care recommendations to the patient.  MDR reporting, failure 
analysis, and trending would still be required, and individual 
events would still be entered into the MAUDE database.  This 
level of reporting will satisfy the regulatory requirements and 
ensure that there is adequate information for trending and 
analysis.  These information sources also operate as a 
confirmation of device performance.  To the extent that an 
individual physician wants to see individual events, that 
information will be available from the MAUDE database.  
Periodic product performance reports can reflect that the device 
is performing as intended. 
This approach is aligned with the product approval and 
labeling processes.  It promotes transparency, and it ensures 
that physicians will not receive redundant or unnecessary 
communications and current and future patients are not 
unnecessarily alarmed.  Finally, it is consistent with current 
regulatory structures. 
                                                          
 60. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2000); 21 C.F.R. pt. 814 (2005); 21 CFR § 860.7 
(2005). 
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b. Group 2 
In this category, the malfunction rate by itself or in 
combination with all other malfunction causes exceeds the 
predicted and labeled rate. It does not matter whether the 
particular problem was known or unknown.  The patient is not 
getting what the patient expected and what was represented to 
the physician and FDA.  This product may well be at least 
technically adulterated or misbranded.61  The physician should 
be notified of these events through a product safety alert.62  The 
safety alert should describe the issue, its frequency, any 
possible detection or mitigation steps, the new overall predicted 
malfunction rate, and any other relevant information.  Once 
publicly available, the new malfunction rate then would become 
the new standard against which any future device issues get 
measured. 
In one sense, the predicted malfunction rate can be viewed 
as analogous to a contractual warranty.  The warranty provides 
that the device will not malfunction for whatever reason at 
more that a specified rate.  If the device is malfunctioning at a 
higher rate than “warranted,” the physician is notified. 
This approach provides the physician with new patient 
care or risk/benefit information.  It promotes transparency and 
should help build or restore trust in the system.  It provides 
FDA with updated information and the opportunity to assess 
any issue or set of issues on an ongoing basis.  Finally, it gives 
industry and other stakeholders certainty. 
c. Group 3: 
In the third category, a new event or trend is discovered 
and the overall malfunction frequency rate or severity from all 
causes, including the new event, is less than or equal to the 
predicted malfunction rate.  The labeling already correctly 
identifies the failure rate and includes any relevant 
malfunction detection or mitigation information.63  As such, the 
current product labeling informs the physician of all necessary 
and appropriate information.  Given the continuing accuracy of 
the labeling, nothing new needs to be communicated to the 
                                                          
 61. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 352 (2000). 
 62. Generally speaking, the requirements of 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 and 21 
C.F.R. pt. 806 would be applicable to this situation. 
 63. For our purposes, mitigation includes decreasing either the risk or 
severity of the event. 
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physician for patient care purposes.  No safety alert is required.  
Nothing more should be required from a compliance 
perspective. 
However, quality, trust, and transparency goals encourage 
more communication.  Patients live with these devices and so 
have an ongoing desire for information.64  As such, information 
about these trends, even though arguably offering nothing new 
for patient care, can easily be made available to physicians via 
Internet-based product performance reports or publicly 
available physician manuals.  This update can also include an 
affirmation that the existing predicted malfunction rate 
remains correct.  Throughout this process, the manufacturer’s 
obligations for MDR reporting, event analysis, and trending 
would remain. 
New information of this type should not be considered by 
the agency or the public as evidence of non-compliance.  As is 
the situation today, updates to product performance reports 
should not be treated as labeling changes subject to FDA 
review and approval.65  To do so would build delays into 
informing the physician, burden FDA, and convert quality 
initiatives into compliance matters.  Since the device is still 
performing better than labeled or warranted, this is a quality 
initiative.  Manufacturers should not be punished, penalized, or 
criticized for quality initiatives. 
d. Group 4 
The fourth and final group includes device issues (old or 
new) which occur at a rate less than the labeled malfunction 
rate but for which additional detection or mitigation 
information now exists.  Detection or mitigation information in 
this context means information that is different from what is 
already publicly available to the physician and that would 
enhance the physician’s ability to selectively detect this 
particular malfunction or to reduce or eliminate the potential 
health impact of the malfunction. 
This group presents a more complex situation.  From one 
perspective, the device is continuing to satisfy the product 
labeling, including its specified malfunction rate.  The 
                                                          
 64. See Bartels, supra note 3, at 184-85; Salberg, supra note 3. 
 65. One detail to be addressed upon implementation of this concept is 
whether any provisions of 21 C.F.R. pt. 814 need to be modified to permit 
changes to product performance reports without FDA review and approval. 
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risk/benefit calculation that supported the initial implant 
decision remains unchanged.  Given that, the device may not be 
considered legally adulterated or misbranded.  However, the 
fact remains that additional information can improve patient 
outcomes or device performance.  In this situation, the product 
should be considered compliant, but the product quality can be 
improved.  Quality improvement opportunities can exist 
without the product being in violation of any FDA regulation.  
If we mutate quality improvement opportunities into “recalls” 
and non-compliance, we will discourage and penalize quality 
improvements and risk misleading consumers about the nature 
of the issue. 
At the same time, we should not ignore this information.  
From the patient and physician perspective, quality 
considerations predominate, and the manufacturer should 
make this new information available.  The product performance 
updates can be used to promptly communicate this information.  
Again, such updates would involve established trends,66 not 
random events.  The only difference would be in timing.  Rather 
than waiting for an annual update or revision to a product 
performance report, the update would take place promptly.  
The dividing line between a product performance update and a 
product safety alert is whether the product is performing as 
well or better than its specifications.  This is the difference 
between a quality improvement and violative product. 
Reserving the safety alert process for situations involving 
risks greater than those set forth in the labeling enhances 
communication clarity, avoids diluting the impact of actual 
safety alerts, reduces inappropriate patient reaction, provides a 
consistent linkage between the product labeling and the 
original risk/benefit calculation, and does not inappropriately 
discourage use of lifesaving therapy. 
So, is there precedent or support for this approach?  First, 
issuing safety alerts for products out of specification that pose 
some patient health risk is consistent with current FDA 
practice.67  The proposed total predicted malfunction rate is 
simply another device specification.  Second, the product 
performance reports are essentially equivalent to how medical 
information, apart from drug or device issues, is already 
                                                          
 66. The definition of a “trend” should be device-specific, part of the 
Quality System of the manufacturer, and subject to FDA review. 
 67. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 (2005). 
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communicated to physicians.  The physician currently has the 
duty to keep abreast of developments in his or her field.  This 
continuing education process relies on physicians reading the 
medical literature and attending medical meetings.  For 
example, if one physician learns of a better way to perform a 
particular surgical technique, that information is 
communicated through medical literature and medical 
meetings.  This approach to device quality improvement 
information uses the same communication process.  If it is 
acceptable and usable for physicians in the surgical technique 
situation, it should work here. 
If we incorporate an overall malfunction rate in the 
product labeling and use that rate as the notification trigger, 
then defining what constitutes a malfunction is critical.  First, 
the labeled malfunction rate should include anticipated or 
potential malfunctions, not just the rate of past events.  The 
risk being assessed by the physician and the patient is the risk 
of a future event, not just what has already happened.  Second, 
as discussed earlier, it should use the MDR definition of deaths, 
serious injuries, or malfunctions.68  This approach allows 
comparison of data across systems and provides an overall 
quality indicator for the consumer.  The traditional adverse 
event descriptions, warning, and contraindications in the 
product labeling would remain.  This concept simply adds new 
information, namely the overall “all cause” predicted 
malfunction rate as well as any subsets deemed appropriate, to 
the labeling. 
4. Various Regulatory and Market Forces Should Drive 
Manufacturers to Be Accurate in Calculating the Total 
Predicted Malfunction Rate 
Any new regulatory approach should be reviewed with a 
cynical eye.  Is there a way to “game” this new system?  Here, 
the initial predicted malfunction rate in the labeling is the key 
trigger point.  So, would a company seek to game the system 
and simply publish a high malfunction rate and thus minimize 
or eliminate the risk of formal product recalls? 
Two mechanisms should prevent this.  The first is the 
marketplace.  Every competitor will also be publishing overall 
malfunction rates.  In this environment, reliability becomes a 
basis of competition.  Companies with lower malfunction rates 
                                                          
 68. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.3 (2005). 
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should garner a competitive advantage.  Public awareness 
would reinforce the market pressures.  By making overall 
malfunction rates transparent and comparable, we use market 
forces to drive higher reliability and prevent “sandbagging.” 
The second check on artificially high malfunction rates is 
the FDA itself.  By making overall malfunction rates part of the 
submission and approval process, FDA will be able to consider 
that rate in device approval decisions.  FDA certainly should 
question a manufacturer’s submission if there is any significant 
increase in malfunction rates over previous generations or over 
competitor’s products.  FDA’s inspection process, including pre-
PMA inspections, can also review the accuracy of the 
manufacturer’s predicted malfunction rate. 
Of course, this then raises the opposite issue.  Will 
companies seek to publish excessively low malfunction rates as 
a way to gain a competitive edge?  Several control mechanisms 
should prevent such actions.  First, if the labeling understates 
the actual malfunction rate, the product could be considered 
adulterated or misbranded.69  As such, shipments of those 
products expose the company and individuals to significant 
enforcement actions.70  During inspections, FDA can easily 
compare complaint and MDR information against stated failure 
rates to assess compliance.  FDA also has access to information 
from sources other than the manufacturer, including the MDR 
and MAUDE databases, published medical literature, and 
active surveillance systems such as MedSun.  Second, if one 
understates the malfunction rate, one is then exposed to 
additional formal product safety alerts and relabeling 
requirements. 
Pressures to game the system in either direction are 
negated or balanced by market dynamics and the regulatory 
system.  Here, market forces and regulatory requirements are 
aligned to drive accuracy and compliance.  Consumers will now 
be able to compare real safety alert rates and respond in the 
marketplace.  As a result, manufacturers have every incentive 
to make labeled malfunction rates as accurate as possible. 
                                                          
 69. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 351, 352 (2000). 
 70. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (reaffirming criminal 
liability for corporate executives even in the absence of intent); see also 21 
U.S.C. §§ 332-34 (2000) (describing FDA enforcement options). 
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5. The System Must Address the Distribution of Other Non-
Compliant Devices 
To date, the entire discussion has revolved around 
determining the criteria for triggering a product safety alert 
related to patient safety.  For the sake of completeness, we 
must address product issues that do not involve safety or 
efficacy issues. 
First, there are products which do not meet specifications 
or are otherwise non-compliant but present no safety or efficacy 
concerns.  These products may be considered “technically” 
adulterated.  The question is whether a product safety alert 
should be initiated for these product issues.  Given the need to 
both avoid unnecessary consumer concern and to ensure that 
the importance of safety alerts are not diluted, it seems clear 
that it would not be appropriate to use the safety alert 
mechanisms discussed above.  “Safety Alerts” should be 
reserved for safety issues. 
FDA has access to a number of enforcement tools to 
address these issues.  These can range from inspections and 
“483” observations to seizures and criminal prosecution.71  Use 
of these processes rather than safety alerts preserves the 
integrity of the safety alert system while giving FDA its full 
panoply of enforcement tools.  Under these circumstances, if 
FDA wants to pull products from the distribution chain, it can 
use its seizure powers.72 
There are some circumstances in which devices are being 
marketed or distributed without FDA approval.  Because these 
products have not gone through the safety review process 
under the PMA regulations or the investigational device 
exemption (IDE) regulations,73 it is difficult to determine 
whether these devices pose a health risk.  In this situation, 
logic dictates that safety alerts and actual product recalls may 
well be appropriate in addition to the usual enforcement 
mechanisms. 
                                                          
 71. See, e.g.,  21 U.S.C. §§ 332-34 (establishing injunctive relief, penalties, 
and seizure as possible enforcement options). 
 72. FDA can also use its enforcement powers in addition to a safety alert 
in instances involving a violative product that presents a risk to health.  For 
example, the seizure provisions specifically cover products that are “dangerous 
to health.”  21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1)(B). 
 73. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 814 (2005) (establishing premarket approval 
requirements);  21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2005); 21 C.F.R. pt. 812 (2005) (outlining 
IDE requirements). 
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D. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 
The proposed approach to health-based product issues can 
be visualized as follows: 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Product 
Performance 
Performance 
better than 
labeling 
Events 
exceed 
predictions 
New event; 
performance 
better than 
labeling; 
no mitigation 
New event; 
performance 
better than 
labeling; 
no mitigation 
Complaint 
Handling 
Obligations 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Update to 
Physicians 
Manual 
No Yes No Yes 
Product 
Performance 
Report 
Update 
Reconfirmed 
at next 
publication 
Yes Updated at 
next 
publication 
Yes, prompt 
product 
performance 
update 
Product 
Safety Alert 
No Yes No No 
Actual 
Physical 
Recall 
No  Yes, if 
needed to 
protect 
patients 
No Yes, if 
needed to 
protect 
patients 
 
Few changes need to be made in either the regulatory 
systems or current manufacturer or physician practices in 
order to implement this new approach.  This approach is 
consistent with current regulatory processes including device 
reporting and surveillance requirements under 21 U.S.C. § 360i 
and 21 C.F.R. part 821 and FDA’s mandatory recall rights 
under 21 U.S.C. § 360l.  FDA already has the authority to 
consider device reliability, including total malfunction rates.74  
As such, only the following general actions would be needed to 
implement this proposal: 
? Product labeling (including physician manuals) 
                                                          
 74. See 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(b)(4) (specifically stating that in considering the 
safety and efficacy of a PMA device, FDA will consider “[t]he reliability of the 
device”). 
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must include an overall malfunction rate.  This 
rate can be added to current product labeling 
either over a defined time or when the next 
labeling update occurs. 
? The regulations need to provide for mandatory 
safety alerts when the total malfunction rate 
(including known and new events) exceeds the 
labeled rate.  This could require amending certain 
provisions in 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 and 21 C.F.R.  
part 806. 
? Product performance reports would be used to 
provide the physician access to any additional or 
new information about trends within the 
anticipated failure rate.  These can be required 
either by regulation or via the Conditions of 
Approval for a PMA device. 
This approach satisfies the stakeholder objectives and  
links the various parts of the device regulatory system 
together.  It protects public health, maintains the role of the 
physician, enhances trust, uses the regulatory system, and 
provides certainty.  It also differentiates compliance issues 
from quality improvement initiatives.  The required updates to 
the product performance report ensure transparency and 
provide access to quality improvement information.  Anyone 
can follow up on the new information as desired. 
This approach also satisfies the criteria for an effective 
trigger.  It is objective and clinically relevant as it is based on a 
device-specific safety and efficacy analysis.  It is not only 
consistent with FDA’s current statutory and regulatory 
system,75 but it actually goes further and links many key parts 
of the device regulatory process.  Finally, it is applicable to all 
devices and results in a uniform system with device-specific 
triggers. 
Making this information public does carry with it some 
risk.  Safety alerts must be made public in order to protect 
public health.  There is the risk of patient overreaction or 
adverse psychological impacts when the product is performing 
as well or better than predicted.  By making information on 
these products available in the product performance report, we 
are minimizing the risk and making a conscious policy decision 
                                                          
 75. As discussed above, this approach is entirely consistent with FDA’s 
risk-based notification criteria in 21 USC § 360h. 
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that the value of the information in that form, even if not 
actionable, outweighs the risk. 
VI. A PLEA FOR PREEMPTION 
Assuming that FDA does indeed establish a trigger 
mechanism—as it is encouraged the agency does—that trigger 
must be national and uniform in application.  This requires 
preemption. 
Patient and physician needs are identical from Maine to 
California.  Having different explicit or implicit trigger points is 
simply unworkable.  It is medically, ethically, and politically 
impossible to defend notifying patients and physicians in one 
state and not another.  Modern communication systems such as 
email, blogs, and message boards result in any safety alert 
being at least national in scope.  In addition, companies post 
product information and safety alerts on websites and issue 
press releases due to SEC considerations and FDA issues such 
as Class I recalls.  Safety alerts follow products across state 
lines.  As such, safety alerts have an unavoidable national 
scope.  Therefore, the rules determining when there should be a 
safety alert must be national in scope as well. 
One can create a de facto trigger through legal channels 
other than FDA.  Private class actions based on a failure to 
notify physicians or patients of a product malfunction trend or 
state actions based on similar grounds will create trigger or 
notification requirements that are inconsistent with FDA and 
potentially inconsistent among the states.  This is not an idle 
concern.  For example, at the time of this article, the New York 
Attorney General has recently filed an action against Guidant 
for failure to issue a safety alert or recall for Prizm 2.76 
The obvious response to this preemption plea is that a 
state may be permitted to establish different, non-conflicting 
standards.  Here, however, any rule that sets a different 
standard than FDA’s is conflicting.  The notification trigger 
actually makes two policy decisions.  The first decision is when 
a safety alert is needed.  The second implicit but equally 
                                                          
 76. See Press Release, Offices of New York State Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer, Medical Device Maker Sued for Hiding Defibrillator Defect (Nov. 3, 
2005), www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/nov/nov03a_05.html.  I offer no opinion 
as to the legal or factual merits of this action.  The point is simply that in the 
future if a manufacturer has complied with the FDA trigger requirements, 
such a state action would be inconsistent with established national policy. 
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important policy decision is that in the defined circumstances, 
a physician or patient notification not only is not required but 
will have a negative impact on the consumer.  It is this policy 
decision that demands preemption.  If a state requires 
notification in a situation in which FDA does not, that state is 
overriding FDA’s determination that such a notification may 
actually be inimical to the patients’ interests. 
Once FDA establishes a trigger mechanism, compliance 
with that trigger requirement must shield manufacturers from 
different national, state, or private standards or requirements 
for instituting product alerts.  It is unfair and undercuts 
national policy as expressed in the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 
for a manufacturer to be subjected to such inconsistent 
requirements. 
The legal authority for preemption exists; 21 U.S.C. § 360k 
expressly provides for preemption for certain device 
requirements.  This provides that no state or other political 
subdivision may have in effect any requirement: “1) which is 
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable 
under this Act to a device, and 2) which relates to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a 
requirement applicable to a device under this Act.”77 
Both required elements of § 360k are present.  As 
discussed above, a different rule would be either “different from 
or in addition to” FDA’s regulations, and the notification rules, 
by definition, relate to safety.78  As such, FDA has the authority 
to create a trigger that preempts any inconsistent public or 
private trigger or any effort to penalize a company for 
complying with the FDA-mandated trigger.79  FDA must 
exercise this power to preempt once it determines the 
appropriate trigger policy.  Anything less eviscerates FDA’s 
policy and its responsibilities. 
                                                          
 77. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000). 
 78. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360h (2000); 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 (2005) 
(establishing criteria for triggering a device notification). 
 79. Other legal theories or causes of action may still exist.  For example, 
there may well still be a standard product liability action for marketing an 
allegedly defective product.  The issues of preemption for these types of actions 
are governed by cases such as Medtronic v.Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), and 
Kemp v. Medtronic, 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2001).  A full analysis of 
preemption issues including the issues surrounding preemption of product 
liability suits in a Class III medical device context is outside the scope of this 
commentary. 
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VII. COMMUNICATION PROCESSES 
Success always occurs in private and failure in full view. 
- Anonymous 
A. PHYSICIANS, NOT MANUFACTURERS SHOULD HAVE THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO COMMUNICATE SAFETY ALERTS TO PATIENTS 
Historically, information about device malfunction issues 
has gone from the manufacturer to the physician and then from 
the physician to the patient.  Several commentators have 
suggested that the manufacturer communicate device 
malfunction information directly to the patient in addition to 
providing the information to the physician.80 
There are several reasons why this concept is not prudent.  
First, such a communication could interfere with the patient-
physician relationship.  Only the physician is in a position to 
customize the general information to the specific needs and 
desires of the individual patient.  Multiple communications to 
the same person about the same issue invites confusion, 
particularly when dealing with issues and concepts as 
necessarily complex as product safety alert information.81 
This is not to say that patients are incapable of 
understanding such information.  The goal is to provide clear, 
consistent information that is relevant to the specific 
circumstances of that patient.  The most effective method for 
doing so focuses on the one source—the physician—who has the 
relationship with the patient and understands the particular 
needs of that person.  The physician can answer specific 
medical questions and make medical recommendations. 
The manufacturer can be a resource for the physician and 
should be willing to provide additional information at the 
request of the physician.  The manufacturer has a separate 
obligation to ensure that the physician communication is clear 
and accurate. 
Before we mandate direct manufacturer to patient 
communications, we must remember that some patients may 
not want to have direct contact with the manufacturer or to 
receive certain information.  Given that it is impossible to 
                                                          
 80. See, e.g., Maisel, supra note 33, at 957. 
 81. In essence, I assert that the criteria set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a)(2) 
regarding notifications to physicians rather than patients have been satisfied 
for safety alerts for products such as ICDs.  Exceptions for unusual 
circumstances can always be made. 
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determine in advance who has what preferences, the physician 
must be the link to the patient. 
B. TIMING 
Many physicians want the opportunity to communicate to 
the patient before the information becomes public.  That is 
probably an impossible goal.  Often the manufacturer and FDA 
will immediately issue a press release about the product issue 
that echoes the content of the actual physician notification.  
The actual physician communication is usually available on the 
company or FDA website.  Public disclosure of recalls also may 
be required by SEC.  Any press release will become public 
before the physician has received the information and had an 
opportunity to communicate with every patient. 
In addition, email, message boards, and blogs speed 
information around the globe.  While we can debate the 
accuracy or value of such communication tools, they are real.  
As such, the patient may well have significant information 
before the physician can contact the person.  It is impossible to 
control these various information sources until physicians can 
communicate with each patient.  This is the new reality of the 
information age, and physicians must be prepared to reeducate 
patients who have gotten questionable information from one of 
these sources. 
C. TERMINOLOGY 
Multiple commentators have expressed concerns over the 
lack of clarity in the current recall terminology.  The most 
common example is the use of the term “recall.”82  Whether 
intended or not, this term communicates the actual, physical 
removal of a product.  In most recalls, this is simply not the 
case.  As a result, patients can be unnecessarily upset and 
confused. 
The term “safety alert” should be the universal term for a 
physician notification of situations in which the device is not 
meeting its labeling.  This term is accurate and does not 
mislead the lay public.  The term “recall” would be included in 
a safety alert if the recommendation is that the product 
actually be physically removed from a patient.  Otherwise the 
term creates too much confusion and apprehension, 
                                                          
 82. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 (2005). 
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particularly among patients. 
The current “recall” classification system can work as long 
as the definitions are used consistently.  This requires an 
accurate assessment of the risk and a consistent application of 
risk analysis methodologies including the use of the actual 
device risk.  This is the total risk to the patient (risk of 
malfunction multiplied by the risk of injury in the event of 
malfunction) rather than the risk to the patient if the device 
actually malfunctions.83  The latter approach is not consistent 
with the actual classification language.  More importantly, it 
miscommunicates the real situation to the physician and 
patient.84  In order to accurately communicate risk, the 
classification system must consider both the risk of device 
malfunction and the risk to the patient in the event that the 
specific device malfunctions. 
FDA must exercise discipline when making classification 
decisions.  Objective criteria need to be established and 
followed.  Even if the issue involves an implantable device, if 
the risk is less than the frequency requirements for a Class I 
designation, so be it.  “Overclassification” weakens the system, 
unduly alarms patients, and results in true safety alerts 
getting less attention than deserved. 
Other terminology questions may also need to be addressed 
once the overall system has been established. 
D. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The communication process and dissemination of product 
information has caused anxiety and confusion.  Risk 
communication specialists could be a great help in crafting 
accurate, understandable, and non-alarming messages.  The 
key objective is to communicate accurately and to avoid 
unnecessary alarm.  The following conclusions or actions 
should be considered: 
? Product safety alerts should go to physicians, not 
directly to patients. 
                                                          
 83. This is a major difference.  For example, a product may have a 1/5000 
chance of malfunctioning, but if it does malfunction, there is a 1/10 risk of 
patient harm.  Historically, the risk of malfunction is the product of the two 
elements, or a 1/50,000 risk in our example.  If we look only at the second part 
of the risk equation, the “risk” is 1/10. 
 84. A related issue is that many physicians are simply unaware of the 
meaning of the various classifications.  See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 12. 
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? The physician is responsible to communicate with 
the patient.  Manufacturers and FDA should be 
available to support that effort. 
? Communication specialists should be enlisted to 
help craft understandable and accurate messages. 
? The system cannot ensure that physicians have a 
chance to communicate with patients before 
information becomes public. 
? Terminology such as “recall” should be revised to 
enhance clarity. 
FDA’s recall classification system should be reviewed and 
updated.  FDA must apply those classifications in an objective, 
consistent manner.  In part this means that individual FDA 
officials cannot allow personal views about the significance of 
some event to affect the objective classification process. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
A conclusion is the place where you got tired of thinking. 
- Arthur Bloch 
 
The key to this proposal is linking the product labeling to 
the device malfunction notification system.  An overall or 
“total” malfunction rate provides the trigger point for 
determining whether a physician notification is required.  
Different devices can and should have different trigger points 
based upon product reliability, risk, and usage.  Once the 
trigger point is exceeded, a prompt, complete, and 
understandable safety alert must be sent to physicians.  
Product performance reports provide the mechanism for 
physician updates of product trends that do not exceed the 
labeled performance specifications. 
Is this approach perfect?  Of course not.  Any notification 
policy requires policy tradeoffs.  Any line is arbitrary.  No 
definition of “malfunction” is perfect.  Industry compliance and 
FDA oversight is always required.  However, this approach 
does link together various parts of the regulatory system.  It 
allows the trigger to be set in advance, in the public view, and 
in a device-specific manner.  It also encourages quality 
initiatives without branding such actions as examples of non-
compliance. 
The final test is to determine whether this proposal meets 
the objectives set by our commentators.  I believe that it does.  
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Public health is protected because physicians are promptly 
notified of important new information.  The consumer gets 
information whenever the product exceeds predicted and public 
malfunction rates.  This approach also reduces the dangers of 
overnotification and therefore does not create unnecessary 
anxiety among patients.  It also does not discourage the 
appropriate use of device therapies.  There is transparency 
because product labeling sets forth malfunction rates, safety 
alerts are triggered whenever that rate is exceeded, and 
product performance reports contain overall trends even if the 
product overall is performing better than specified.  The 
approach is consistent with the current statutory and 
regulatory systems, and the patient-physician relationship is 
maintained.  Finally, industry and all other stakeholders get 
certainty. 
Let the debate begin. 
 
 
